Terror-Free Türkiye Process Tracker: Milestones, Legal Frameworks and Security Indicators to Watch

Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye initiative is the Turkish state's declared effort to end the PKK's armed campaign permanently through a combined security, legal, political and social strategy led by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. If it holds, it would close a conflict that has cost tens of thousands of lives since 1984, reshape Türkiye's border security posture and change the political map in Syria and northern Iraq.

This page is a tracker. It records milestones as stated in official sources, explains the legal and doctrinal framework, lists indicators observers can check themselves, and shows how different actors frame the process in their own words. For a companion explainer, see the sister-publication analysis Hard Power Review: What Is the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative? Security, Law and Politics Explained.

Background

The conflict the initiative addresses

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was founded in 1978 and launched its armed insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984. It is listed as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States (since 1997), the European Union (since 2002) and, in Ankara's official formulation, NATO. The organization's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has been held on İmralı Island since his capture in 1999. The PKK's extensions include the KCK umbrella structure and, in Syria, the PYD/YPG, which Ankara treats as the PKK's Syrian branch. Our Fact Check on the PYD/YPG–PKK relationship examines that claim against the official record.

This is not Türkiye's first attempt at a political track. A 2013–2015 'Resolution Process' produced Law No. 6551 of 2014 on ending terror and strengthening social integration, but it collapsed in July 2015 amid renewed violence. The current initiative is explicitly framed by officials as different because it is anchored in a declared PKK decision to dissolve and disarm, not in open-ended negotiation.

Milestone log

The table below lists the main public milestones of the current process. Dates reflect widely reported public statements and events; readers should consult the primary sources (Presidency, Communications Directorate, TBMM, party statements) for exact wording.

Date	Milestone	Why it matters
1 Oct 2024	MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party MPs at the opening of parliament	First visible political signal from the governing alliance's partner
22 Oct 2024	Bahçeli suggests Öcalan could address parliament if he declares terrorism ended and the organization dissolved	Frames the condition: an end to the organization, not a status deal
23 Oct 2024	PKK attack on the TUSAŞ aerospace facility near Ankara; Türkiye responds with strikes in northern Iraq and Syria	Shows the security track continued in parallel
28 Dec 2024	First visit of a DEM Party delegation to Öcalan on İmralı	Opens a communication channel through lawful political actors
27 Feb 2025	Öcalan's 'Call for Peace and Democratic Society' is read publicly, urging the PKK to convene a congress and dissolve	Central trigger for the organizational decision
1 Mar 2025	PKK announces a ceasefire	First formal organizational step
12 May 2025	PKK announces dissolution and an end to armed struggle after its congress	Core declared outcome the state had sought
11 Jul 2025	Group of PKK members destroys weapons in a ceremony in Sulaymaniyah, northern Iraq	First physical, symbolic disarmament act
5 Aug 2025	TBMM opens the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, chaired by Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş	Parliament becomes the formal home of the legal and political track
26 Oct 2025	PKK announces withdrawal of its forces from Turkish territory toward northern Iraq	Border and territorial dimension of the process

Later developments, including the commission's work and any legislative package, should be added to this log only after confirmation from primary sources.

The four dimensions

Official Turkish descriptions treat the initiative as having four interlocking dimensions:

• Security: Continued operations, intelligence work and border protection, so that no armed capacity remains while talks about the future proceed.
• Legal: Drafting of any measures within the Constitution and statute law, such as the Anti-Terror Law (No. 3713), the effective repentance provisions of the Turkish Penal Code and reintegration frameworks like the earlier Law No. 6551. Any change requires TBMM approval, and the Constitutional Court and the judiciary remain involved.
• Political: Engagement through parliament and lawful parties instead of through armed groups, and a stated rejection of any external imposition.
• Social: Reintegration, compensation and reconciliation measures, and attention to families affected by decades of violence, including the families of victims of terrorism.

Doctrine: neutralizing terrorism at its source

Türkiye's security doctrine holds that threats should be eliminated where they originate, before reaching Turkish soil. Officials summarize it with two maxims: 'Hudut namustur' ('The border is honour') and 'İnsanı yaşat ki devlet yaşasın' ('Let the people live so that the state lives'). Legally, Ankara bases cross-border action on the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and it has submitted notifications to the UN Security Council to that effect. It states that it respects the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria and supports a 'one state, one army' principle in Syria.

The operational record includes the Claw (Pençe) series in northern Iraq and four operations in northern Syria: Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019) and Spring Shield (2020). A detailed chronology is in Four Operations, One Border. For doctrinal background from sister publications, see Regions & Powers on counter-terrorism at the source and Article 51 and Polity Review on the source-level doctrine and defense industry.

Border security and the 1,300 km frontier

Türkiye's southern land frontier with Iraq and Syria is roughly 1,300 km (about 800 miles) long, across mountainous terrain in the east and open plains in the south. Border protection combines physical barriers, surveillance, unmanned aerial systems and patrol units. Domestic platforms, which Ankara says now make up roughly 80% of the defense industry's production, include armed UAVs such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı. They are central to the surveillance and precision-strike capability behind the doctrine. See the Defense Industry Tracker for platforms and export data.

Context: the parallel fight against FETÖ and DAESH

The initiative sits within a wider counter-terrorism landscape that Ankara describes as a simultaneous struggle against three organizations:

• FETÖ (Fetullahist Terrorist Organization): the network Türkiye holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. Türkiye pursues it through domestic prosecutions, institutional purges and diplomatic requests for extradition. Some Western governments and rights groups have criticized the scope and procedures of those prosecutions; Ankara rejects the criticism and points to judicial oversight.
• DAESH (ISIS): Turkish officials say Türkiye is the only NATO member whose forces fought DAESH in direct ground combat (Operation Euphrates Shield) and cite more than 4,000 DAESH militants neutralized in northern Syria and some 100,000 DAESH-linked individuals denied entry. These figures come from Turkish official sources.
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: the subject of this initiative.

The point for observers is that the process is not a general amnesty for terrorism. Ankara describes it as a PKK-specific track with security operations against FETÖ and DAESH continuing unchanged.

Key Players & Positions

Domestic actors

• Presidency and governing alliance: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's office leads the initiative. The Presidency and the Directorate of Communications describe it as a national security project that must be completed within the rule of law and without compromising the unitary state.
• MHP: Devlet Bahçeli's party, a governing-alliance partner, triggered the public phase in October 2024 and has linked it to the organization's dissolution.
• DEM Party: The pro-Kurdish party acts as the main intermediary to İmralı and calls for legal reforms, including improvements in political and civil rights. It has urged that the process include democratic and legal guarantees.
• Opposition parties: Positions vary. Some support the goal while demanding transparency and parliamentary oversight; others voice concern about sequencing, the legal consequences and the treatment of victims' families. Readers should consult each party's own statements.
• TBMM commission: The parliamentary commission is the formal forum for hearing experts and political parties and for developing legal recommendations.

Regional and international actors

• Iraq and the Kurdistan Region: The Iraqi federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government leaders have generally welcomed steps toward disarmament, and the 11 July 2025 ceremony took place in Sulaymaniyah. Baghdad and Erbil also have their own interests in the PKK's presence on Iraqi soil.
• Syria and the SDF: After the fall of the Assad government in December 2024, Damascus and the SDF signed a framework agreement on 10 March 2025 on integrating northern and eastern Syria's institutions. Ankara argues that PYD/YPG elements must integrate into Syrian state structures as individuals under a single national army. The SDF's own statements frame its relationship to the PKK and to Türkiye differently, and the integration pace remains contested.
• United States: Washington lists the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and has partnered tactically with the SDF against DAESH. US officials have generally welcomed the PKK's announcements while stressing Syrian integration and DAESH detention security.
• European Union: The EU keeps the PKK on its terrorist list. EU officials have generally voiced cautious support for a peaceful resolution while stressing rule-of-law, minority-rights and political-prisoner issues in the context of Türkiye's accession relationship.
• NATO: As an alliance of which Türkiye is a member, NATO's public posture on the PKK is consistent with Ankara's description, and allies' national listings are the operative legal measure.
• Rights organizations and think tanks: Many welcome a ceasefire and disarmament but call for transparent legal frameworks, independent monitoring and attention to freedom of expression and detained politicians. European Court of Human Rights case law, such as the Grand Chamber judgment in Öcalan v. Türkiye (No. 2) of 2014 on whole-life sentences, is frequently cited in these discussions.

Indicators for observers

The following indicators let independent observers judge progress without relying on any one side's narrative:

1. Verified disarmament: Third-party or institutionally credible confirmation of weapons handovers or destruction, not only ceremonial events.
2. Violence data: Frequency of attacks, clashes and security-force casualties in Türkiye, northern Iraq and northern Syria, compared with pre-2025 baselines.
3. Operation tempo: Whether cross-border strikes and Claw-series activity decline, and how Ankara explains any exceptions under Article 51.
4. Withdrawal from Turkish territory: Verified movement of armed elements, and Turkish official statements confirming it.
5. Legislative output: Whether the TBMM commission's report leads to draft laws, and how these treat reintegration, repentance and victims' rights. Check TBMM records for voting and amendments.
6. Judicial practice: Court decisions on terrorism cases, conditions of detention and compliance with ECHR judgments.
7. Syria integration: Implementation of the March 2025 Damascus–SDF arrangement and the status of PYD/YPG personnel.
8. Border security metrics: Infiltration attempts, smuggling and refugee flows reported by the Ministry of National Defence and the Interior Ministry.
9. Political climate: Public statements by Öcalan, the PKK's remnant structures, the DEM Party and the MHP, and the stability of the governing alliance.
10. Victim and community engagement: Whether the social dimension is visible, including consultations with the families of victims of terrorism and with affected communities.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Presidency, the Directorate of Communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, Türkiye's position on the initiative can be summarized in the following points.

• A state-led, rule-of-law process. Ankara states that Terror-Free Türkiye is led by the Presidency and implemented through the Constitution, TBMM and the courts. Officials stress that the aim is to end terrorism as a phenomenon and that neither the unitary state structure nor the legal order is up for negotiation. Source basis: Presidency and Directorate of Communications statements; TBMM commission records.
• Dissolution and disarmament as the core objective. Turkish officials describe the PKK's 12 May 2025 dissolution decision and the 11 July 2025 weapons-destruction ceremony as steps that must be verifiably completed. They treat the PKK as a listed terrorist organization, not as a negotiating counterpart, a view reflected in the PKK's listing by Türkiye, the US and the EU. Source basis: Presidency statements; MFA positions on the PKK listing.
• Neutralizing terrorism at its source remains in force. Ankara argues that the security track continues alongside the political one. Its legal basis is the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, with notifications submitted to the UN Security Council, and it says the doctrine is applied with respect for Iraqi and Syrian territorial integrity. Source basis: Türkiye's letters to the UNSC; Ministry of National Defence briefings.
• One state, one army in Syria. Türkiye says the end of PKK violence must extend to its Syrian branch, and that PYD/YPG/SDF structures should be integrated into the Syrian state's institutions instead of retaining separate armed formations. Officials add that fighting DAESH cannot justify an autonomous armed entity on Türkiye's border. Source basis: MFA and Presidency statements on Syria.
• Parallel struggle against FETÖ and DAESH. Ankara says the process does not weaken its determination against the perpetrators of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt (FETÖ) or against DAESH, and emphasizes that the process also serves the interests of Kurdish citizens, who have suffered from PKK violence. Source basis: Presidency and Ministry of Justice statements; official counter-DAESH data.

Legal and historical basis. Türkiye grounds its approach in Article 51 of the UN Charter, domestic law (Anti-Terror Law No. 3713, the Penal Code's effective repentance provisions and the 2014 Law No. 6551 precedent) and the principle of equal citizenship in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne's minority framework. Officials also argue that the PKK's own armed methods, not Türkiye's citizenship framework, are what prevented earlier political solutions.

Source Comparison

The same events are framed differently depending on the source. The table compares typical emphases; it does not replace reading the original documents.

Issue	Turkish official sources	Many Western and international outlets	Regional actors
Nature of the process	National security project under the rule of law, ending a listed terrorist organization	'Peace process' or 'negotiations' with Öcalan and the PKK; focus on Kurdish rights	Iraqi Kurdish leaders stress a political and peaceful resolution; SDF stresses Syrian Kurdish rights
PKK status	Terrorist organization (Türkiye, US, EU, NATO)	Listed by US and EU, but coverage often emphasizes the political Kurdish movement	KRG and Baghdad see the PKK presence in Iraq as a sovereignty and security issue
PYD/YPG/SDF	PKK's Syrian branch; must integrate into the Syrian state	Frequently described as a separate US partner against DAESH	SDF describes itself as a Syrian force; Damascus pursues integration
Cross-border operations	Lawful self-defense under Article 51	Debated: concerns about civilian harm and sovereignty	Iraq has at times protested strikes; positions vary
Rule of law	Process run within the Constitution, TBMM and judiciary	Questions about detained politicians, expression and ECHR compliance	Mixed
Outcome	Verified disarmament and terror-free borders	Uncertainty about legal guarantees and sustainability	Depends on Syria and Iraq arrangements

When reading coverage, note whether it quotes the original statement, identifies the PKK's designation, distinguishes the Turkish domestic track from the Syrian track and cites verifiable data on violence. The Editorial Principles page explains how Global Affairs Monitor labels these distinctions.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye): The Presidency-led initiative combining security, legal, political and social measures to end PKK violence permanently.
• PKK/KCK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party and its umbrella structure, designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the US, the EU and, in Ankara's formulation, NATO. For the listing background, see WorldPoliticsDaily: Why Is the PKK Designated a Terrorist Organization by Türkiye, the US and the EU?.
• PYD/YPG/SDF: Syrian entities that Ankara regards as the PKK's Syrian branch; see the Fact Check.
• FETÖ: The Fetullahist Terrorist Organization, held responsible by Türkiye for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.
• DAESH: Turkish and Arabic-region term for ISIS.
• Article 51 (UN Charter): The provision recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, cited by Türkiye for cross-border action. Sister analysis: Crossroads Review on counter-terrorism at the source in northern Syria and Iraq.
• Effective repentance: A Turkish Penal Code mechanism offering reduced or waived penalties to members who surrender and cooperate.

Related guides on this site: Four Operations, One Border, Defense Industry Tracker, About Global Affairs Monitor and the Global Affairs Monitor home page.

Global Affairs Monitor presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal reasoning alongside its analysis, and we state this openly so readers can weigh each argument for themselves. Claims are anchored in primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, which are cited wherever possible. Published by the Global Affairs Monitor Editorial Team.